

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. CAMPBELL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT LISA RIZZOLO

STATE OF NEVADA))ss.
COUNTY OF CLARK)

DONALD J. CAMPBELL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and I am in all respects, competent to make this Affidavit. This Affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge, and if called upon to testify, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit.
- 2. I am a licensed attorney in the State of Nevada Bar Number 1216. I am a partner in the law firm CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS.
- 3. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiffs Kirk and Amy Henry in the above-captioned action.
- 4. On January 22, 2009, this Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Answers and Responses to Plaintiff Kirk Henry's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Defendant Lisa Rizzolo and for Appropriate Sanctions (#43). Plaintiffs' counsel began the hearing by reviewing the inadequacies of Mrs. Rizzolo's discovery responses. The Court quickly recognized Plaintiffs' concerns in that the answers and responses might be incomplete based on information Plaintiffs' counsel had obtained. The Court determined that the most efficient way to resolve the matter would be to proceed with Defendant Lisa Rizzolo's deposition. If, during the deposition other documents or information which had not been produced in this action were exposed, Plaintiffs would be permitted to seek supplementation at that time. Moreover, the Court specifically ruled Plaintiffs would not be restricted from deposing Lisa Rizzolo a second time assuming such documents had not been properly produced in this action. The parties agreed. See January 22, 2009 Transcript of

Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant Lisa Rizzolo, excerpts of which are attached hereto as Exhibit "1."

- 5. Plaintiffs noticed Lisa Rizzolo's deposition for February 18, 2009. In the interim, however, an order was entered which prevented Plaintiffs from pursuing discovery relevant to their cause of action brought pursuant to Nevada's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") (#73). Ms. Rizzolo's deposition was vacated as a result in order to allow the Court an opportunity to rule on Plaintiffs' Objections to this order (#82).
- 6. On March 23, 2009, Plaintiffs' objections were sustained in a written order by the Honorable Philip M. Pro (#117). See March 23, 2009 Order, attached hereto as Exhibit "2." This had the effect of re-opening discovery relevant to the Defendants' financial condition. Ms. Rizzolo's deposition was thereafter re-noticed for May 12, 2009. The Court was apprised of the upcoming deposition in the Joint Status Report (#123), filed in response to the Court's request concerning the status of Plaintiffs' original motion to compel Lisa Rizzolo (#121).
- 7. On May 12, 2009, the Plaintiffs conducted Lisa's deposition. See Transcript of Videotaped Deposition of Lisa Rizzolo, attached hereto as Exhibit "3." During that deposition, Ms. Rizzolo admitted that she had transferred millions of dollars to offshore accounts. She further admitted that hundreds of thousands of dollars had thereafter been loaned to her exhusband, Rick. The details of these transactions are further discussed in the body of this motion.
- 8. Ms. Rizzolo's testimony also revealed that an extensive catalog of documents had not been produced in this litigation. The documents withheld included documents relevant to bank accounts, loans, gifts, insurance policies, trusts, personal property, and dispositions of real and personal property.

- 9. Upon concluding Ms. Rizzolo's deposition, the undersigned attempted to conduct a meet and confer regarding the inadequacies of her discovery responses which were exposed throughout her deposition. Mr. Bailus declined to proceed and insisted on Mr. Kelesis' presence. He also demanded Plaintiffs furnish him with a list of documents that should be produced and followed with the improper suggestion that there are other places Plaintiff could be going in order to obtain the documents requested. Mr. Bailus and his client then left.
- 10. On May 13, 2009, Plaintiffs caused a subpoena to be served on the Custodian of Records of Lionel Sawyer & Collins ("LS&C") seeking production of:

"Copies of checks, records of payment, billing invoices, engagement letters, statements of account, fax transmittal sheets, wire transfer records, loan agreements, and promissory notes, relating to any financial transaction executed on behalf of Frederick aka "Rick" Rizzolo, Lisa Rizzolo, The Rick and Lisa Rizzolo Family Trust, The Rick Rizzolo Irrevocable Trust, The Rick J. Rizzolo Separate Property Trust, The RLR Trust, and/or The Lisa M. Rizzolo Separate Property Trust."

See Subpoena, attached hereto as Exhibit "4."

11. This is not the first time Plaintiffs have attempted to obtain documents from a non-party law firm in possession of information relevant to this lawsuit. On September 30, 2008, Plaintiffs served a subpoena on the law firm which jointly represented the Rizzolos in this collusive divorce, Patti, Sgro & Lewis ("PS&L"). The subpoena requested documents similar to those requested from LS&C. The custodian of records at PS&L, however, did not produce records prior to July 2006 after which this Court made the following observation:

It is not clear...whether the custodian conducted a thorough search of the law firm's records for documents responsive to the subpoena. [The Rizzolos' attorney's] statement that Patti, Sgro & Lewis does not have financial records relating to its representation of the Rizzolos...prior to July 2006 appears inconsistent with its obligations under Rule 1.15 of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct which requires that certain client financial records be preserved by the attorney for a period of seven years after the termination of the representation. [The Rizzolos' attorney's] explained the absence of such records

by stating that Patti, Sgro & Lewis moved its office within the past few years, during which records may have been discarded or misplaced, and that some client records were damaged during a flood and were apparently discarded. The circumstances regarding Patti, Sgro & Lewis's inability to produce records for the period prior to July 2006 may, however, be an appropriate subject for further discovery by the Plaintiffs.

See December 29, 2008 Order (#52), attached hereto as Exhibit "5" at p. 8.

- 12. On May 14, 2009, two days after Lisa Rizzolo's deposition, Campbell & Williams associate, Jack DeGree, provided Mr. Bailus with a detailed list of documents which must be produced and reminded him of his client's obligation to produce documents in discovery which are in the "possession, custody, or control" of the client. Plaintiffs requested communication from Mr. Bailus to confirm that he would follow through with his these discovery obligations. See 5/14/09 Letter, attached hereto as Exhibit "6." Mr. Bailus has not responded.
- 13. On May 21, 2009, LS&C objected to the subpoena duces tecum on the basis of attorney-client privilege. LS&C did, however, agree to produce the documents provided: (a) the client gives written authorization, or (b) or pursuant to a court order declaring the privilege inapplicable and ordering production. See 5/21/09 Letter, attached hereto as Exhibit "7."
- 14. Plaintiffs' original discovery requests were served more than seven months ago on October 1, 2008. This court has already extended the deadlines in the discovery scheduling order (#120) and recognized Plaintiffs' diligent attempts to obtain discovery in this action (#73). Plaintiffs remain persistent in their efforts to expedite this case to its conclusion. Plaintiffs have served subpoenas on the law firm that jointly represented the Rizzolos in their divorce (Patti Sgro & Lewis); the law firm that administers the Rizzolos' trust agreements (Lionel Sawyer & Collins); the law firm that represented Mr. Rizzolo and his business entities in the criminal proceedings before this Court (Jones Day); the prison which housed Mr. Rizzolo during the

period of his incarceration (the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los Angeles, California); and multiple casinos which Mr. Rizzolo frequented for gambling (MGM Mirage, Hard Rock Hotel & Casino, and Palms Resort & Casino). The Plaintiffs are exercising their right to obtain discovery from other sources and doing so in an expeditious manner.

- 15. Lisa Rizzolo, however, has yet to produce documents which were discussed in her deposition and also detailed in the May 14, 2009 letter to Mr. Bailus documents which were first requested more than eight months ago on October 1, 2008.
 - 16. I certify that all attached exhibits are true and correct copies.
 - 17. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
 - 18. Declarant further says naught.

DATED this 34 day of June, 2009.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the parties were last before the Court, the Plaintiffs have succeeded in uncovering clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants Rick and Lisa Rizzolo are engaged in an ongoing effort to conceal, launder and covertly transfer millions of dollars in cash.

One central feature of this collusive scheme is the use of offshore accounts. Plaintiffs have now established that Lisa Rizzolo has deposited millions of dollars "awarded" to her in the divorce action into numerous trust accounts held in the Cook Islands. In yet another extremely disturbing, but not surprising development, Plaintiffs have uncovered hundreds of thousands of dollars which have been electronically transferred from those Cook Island accounts back to the United States in the form of "loans." These so-called loans have been made for the benefit ofagain, to no one's surprise - Rick Rizzolo.

So that this Court is afforded a flavor for the brazen nature of this artifice, Plaintiffs offer the following portions of Mrs. Rizzolo's testimony:

- Q. What is Southpac Trust International?
- A. It is the bank that's over there. I guess at the -I guess it's the Cook Islands. I wasn't aware of what islands it was on.

See Ex. 3 at 60:10-13.

- Q. All right. Do you have any foreign bank account?
- I do. A.
- Where? Q.
- At Southpac. But I wasn't aware that it was the Cook Islands, sorry. Α.

See Ex. 3 at 61:4-9.

* * * *

- A. My account that's an international account is held by me and my own personal trust.
- All right. And when was the first time that you funded that account? Q.
- I don't know the exact date, but its possible in either 2005 I believe A.
- All right. And was that a short time after your divorce? Q.
- Yes. A.

Cas	2:08-cv-006	335-PMP-GWF Document 127 Filed 06/05/2009 Page 11 of 3						
1	A.							
2	Q.	And moreover, when asked if there was a distribution or whether you						
3		were a grantor of or transferor of a foreign trust, your tax return indicated once again in the negative, "no," right?						
4	A.	That's what is says, "no."						
5	See Fr. 2 at 166.0 167.6							
6	See Ex. 3 at 166:9-167:6.							
7		* * * *						
	Q. A.	And calling your attention once again to LR00074 [2007 tax return] – Um-hum.						
8	Q.	foreign accounts and trusts, correct?						
9	A.	Right?						
10	Q.	And again, under 7a, calling for the disclosure of any interest you had in						
	Q.	a financial account in a foreign country, you said "no," right? Correct?						
11	Ä.	"No" is marked here.						
12	See Ex. 3 at 169:21-170:8.							
13		* * * *						
14 15	Q.	as to the identification or the name of any foreign country, there is nothing listed there, correct?						
	A.	Right.						
16	Q.	And with respect to the question as to: "Did you receive a distribution or were you a grantor of a foreign trust?" You again said "no," correct?						
17	A.	That's what is marked here.						
18	See Ex. 3 at 170:11-171:1.							
19		* * * *						
20	Q.	This production is of account statements from Capital Security Bank, Limited, Bate stamped LR00263 through and inclusive of 275. Agreed?						
21	A.	Agreed.						
22	See Ex. 3 at 177:20-23.							
23		* * * *						
24	Q.	Okay. It says that on November 8, 2006 there was a distribution to the						
25	A.	trust account of Lionel, Sawyer & Collins of \$200,000. Do you see that? I do.						
26	Q.	What was that for?						
40	A.	I believe that was – I believe this was a loan.						
27	Q. A.	Okay. To who? To Rick.						
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Cas	2:08-cv-006	35-PMP-GWF	Document 127	Filed 06/05/2009	Page 12 of 30			
1 2	See Ex. 3 at 178:7-179:7.							
3	***							
	Q. Okay. There was a loan document created? A. I believe so.							
4	Q. Is there a reason you didn't turn that over to us?							
5	A. I don't have it in my possession.							
6	See Ex. 3 at 180:9-13.							
7	* * * *							
8	QMarch 1st 2007, through the 31st of March 2007, correct?							
•	A. Right.							
9	Q. Okay. Has interested received of \$10, 692, correct? A. Yes.							
10	Q.							
11	another \$400,000 from that account?							
	A. Q.	Right. For what purpos	3 9 9					
12	A.		as another loan to Ri	ck.				
13			and another roam to the					
14	See Ex. 3 at 185:21-186:7.							
			* * * *	•				
15	Q.			itional \$400,000 Ioan				
16				usband, Rick Rizzolo,	was there a			
17	promissory note created for that? A. Yes, I believe so.							
18	See Ex. 3 at 190:2-6.							
19			* * * 1	•				
20	Q.	Nor have you pr	oduced that note in t	his litigation?				
21	A.	No.						
41	See Ex. 3 at 191:7-9.							
22	* * * * *							
23	Q.	Calling your atte		e account statement da	ited March			
24		31st, 2007. Cou		whether or not any o				
25	A. I believe so.							
26	Q. And how was it paid back?							
20	A.	By check.	waa maid baal-0					
27	Q. A.	And how much I believe 600.00	was paid back? 0. I'm not positive (of that				
28	•••	2 00.1070 000,00	o. x in not positive (

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Q. And when was it paid back?

I'm not sure of the date. A.

So this is all – the entire 400,000 was paid back? Q.

I believe so. A.

All right. And you don't know when it was paid back? Q.

A. I don't.

Q. And it was - but it was paid by check to you?

I believe so. I'm questioning my memory. A.

Well, where would the documents be reflecting that payment? Q.

I imagine in Rick's possession. A.

See Ex. 3 at 205:5-206:7.

In Plaintiffs' complaint, it is asserted that numerous transactions involving Mr. and Mrs. Rizzolo are fraudulent and violate The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"). Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit "8." The UFTA was adopted in Nevada in 1987. See NRS 112.140 et seq. The Plaintiffs contend that Mr. and Mrs. Rizzolo engaged in a series of fraudulent transactions in violation of the UFTA. They include, in part:

- "the [Defendants]...formed a so-called "family trust" and thereafter transferred their assets into the same in an attempt to shield the assets available to compensate the Henrys for their catastrophic injuries." See Ex. 8 at ¶ 13.
- "the [Defendants] obtained a collusive divorce in which the Defendant Lisa Rizzolo was awarded nearly every listed community asset of the parties of any appreciable value except the real estate, furniture, fixtures and equipment associated with the Crazy Horse Too which both [Defendants] knew would be subject to forfeiture..." See Ex. 8 at ¶ 15.
- "Rick Rizzolo also 'agreed' to assume the burden of an additional 'debt' of Five Million Dollars which he would pay over to Lisa Rizzolo in the form of 'alimony.' In this regard, the Defendant Rick Rizzolo also obtained a Five Million Dollar loan which was secured by the underlying property from which the racketeering enterprise known as The Crazy Horse Too was conducted, knowing full well that he would default on the same and would further diminish the assets available for forfeiture and to pay damages to the Henrys." See Ex. 8 at ¶ 16-17.
- "...the Defendant Rick Rizzolo engaged in numerous cash transactions involving millions of dollars in the form of 'loans,' gambling 'debts,' and other third party transactions, all of which were designed to further

obscure and conceal the nature, extent and location of his assets." See Ex. 8 at ¶ 18.

Additional causes of action for common law fraud and conspiracy to defraud are also pled.

II. ARGUMENT

A defendant's financial condition is the core subject of inquiry for discovery in cases involving the fraudulent transfer of assets. As such, Defendant should be compelled to answer and produce documents responsive to the Interrogatories and Requests for Production which are set forth herein, *infra*. Plaintiffs' initial discovery requests were served October 1, 2008. It is nearly eight months later and a full production has yet to be forthcoming. It is little wonder Lisa Rizzolo is implementing every possible pretext to delay discovery of her financial assets, given that the assertions in Plaintiffs' complaint are being fully supported by the evidence produced thus far in discovery. Indeed, the Defendants' furtive and deceitful acts since September 20, 2001, have even resulted in their hiding assets in offshore accounts in an effort to deprive the Plaintiffs of their regretful entitlement to compensation.

A. The First Hearing On Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Lisa Rizzolo (#43)

The inadequacy of Lisa Rizzolo's discovery responses was first brought before the Court on January 22, 2009. At the hearing, the undersigned began setting forth each of Lisa Rizzolo's incomplete, nonresponsive answers and the improper objections asserted to each of these requests. The Court devised a plan as an alternative to ruling on the motion at that time. His Honor set forth the plan for resolving this discovery dispute as follows:

- strikes me here as I'm listening you go through this, and - I'm hesitating because I want to frame it in the right way. It strikes me that in some of these responses where you have certain information, you have your doubts as to whether you have complete information. Now for instance, the reference to bank accounts, but you have found some discovery of it, that there may be or there are or may be other accounts, or there may be other assets that haven't been listed.

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It would strike the Court - and I'm - number one, beginning with the broad scope of the discovery requests that are made, there has been responses provided. There are questions that the plaintiff has, perhaps, maybe probably legitimate questions is this a complete and thorough response?

It would seem to the Court that perhaps the way to go here would be to at least to take the deposition of Ms. Rizzolo, go through these responses, determine in that deposition under oath, ask the kind of questions you have asked, and determine whether there is anything or basis for something else, request supplementation at that point if it appears appropriate to do so. And then if you don't get it come back to court to compel, once you have explored these matters...

See Ex. 1 at 13:8-14:6 (emphasis added). The parties agreed to proceed in the Court's recommended fashion, taking Ms. Rizzolo's deposition and inquiring into her answers and responses. Information obtained by Plaintiffs' counsel prior to the January 22, 2009 hearing established Lisa Rizzolo was not disclosing or producing all of the available information to her, nor was she making reasonable efforts to obtain the information. Nothing has changed.

Per the Court's directive, Ms. Rizzolo's deposition was noticed shortly after the January 22, 2009 hearing. It was then vacated as a result of the Court's February 3, 2009 order on Plaintiffs' motion to compel brought against Rick Rizzolo (#73). This order prevented Plaintiffs from inquiring into the Defendants' financial condition as it relates to the Plaintiffs' fraudulent transfer cause of action. After review of Plaintiffs' objections to the February 3, 2009 order, the Court essentially ordered discovery re-opened shortly thereafter. The Plaintiffs re-noticed Ms. Rizzolo's deposition for May 12, 2009.

Lisa Rizzolo's deposition went forward as scheduled. Lisa Rizzolo's counsel took extensive notes during the deposition and both counsel and client repeatedly acknowledged the continuing duty to supplement various documents in this litigation. See Ex. 3 at 103:13-104:10 (bank account statements); 176:15-25 (insurance policies); 248:10-250:15 (applications for loans); 97:24-100:19 (trust account statements).

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After Lisa's testimony showcased her woefully inadequate discovery responses, Plaintiffs' counsel did exactly what the Court directed - "request supplementation at that point if it appears appropriate to do so...[a]nd then if you don't get it come back to court to compel." See Ex. 1 at 14:3-5. After concluding Lisa's deposition, Plaintiffs' counsel requested a meet and confer conference to ensure the substance of what would likely be a large supplementation. Lisa's testimony was fresh in the minds of counsel; extensive notes had been taken by counsel for both parties; and it was entirely appropriate to request supplementation just as the Court had directed. Mr. Bailus refused to proceed. He insisted on the presence of Mr. Kelesis even though Mr. Kelesis had departed halfway through the deposition. Mr. Bailus also requested a list of requested documents be submitted to him and then lumped Plaintiffs' counsel with the improper suggestion that the information could be obtained from other sources. Nevertheless, two days later, Plaintiffs' counsel forwarded an extensive list of documents to be produced and requested confirmation that Ms. Rizzolo's discovery obligations would be met. This list was not intended to be all-inclusive in light of the fact that the transcript had not been Nevertheless, no response from Ms. Rizzolo's counsel has been received by counsel yet. forthcoming.

The final step in the Court's recommended process set forth in the January 22, 2009 hearing is being implemented now - the renewed motion to compel.

В. The Documents Sought Are Relevant To Showing Defendants' Intent To "Hinder, Delay and Defraud" The Henrys' Collection

There is now substantial indicia demonstrating the Defendants' divorce was a sham, entered into for purpose of depriving the Henrys of the \$9 million dollars owed them pursuant to the settlement agreement. That evidence includes the following:

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On November 8, 2006, Lisa "loaned" Rick two hundred thousand dollars (\$200,000.00) from her offshore bank account in the Cook Islands. She did not charge interest. Ms. Rizzolo contends the debt owed by Rick is evidenced in a promissory note, and thinks it was repaid. No documentary evidence has been produced in this litigation to support either of these assertions. See Ex. 3 at 177:13-183:18; 205:5-206:7.

- In March 2007, Lisa loaned Rick another four hundred thousand dollars (\$400,000.00) from the same offshore account. Again, Lisa has not produced any evidence of a promissory note or any repayment on this purported note. See Ex. 3 at 185:18-191:9; 205:5-206:7.
- During his incarceration, Lisa paid at least fifty thousand dollars (\$50,000.00) for Rick's legal expenses. See Ex. 3 at 208:11-208:21. She did not produce any documents to reflect this gift/loan.
- Ms. Rizzolo made two separate rent payments of twenty-five thousand dollars (\$25,000.00) each on the Crazy Horse property. See Ex. 3 at 208:22-209:14. No documents were produced to reflect these gifts/loans.
- Lisa remains the beneficiary of Rick's life insurance policy. See Ex. 3 at 243:19-244:9. No further information was produced as to this policy, i.e. what company issued the policy, when it was issued, the amount on the policy is, and when she was named on the policy, and so forth.
- Rick owes Lisa a total of five million dollars (\$5,000,000,00) to be paid over 60 monthly installments pursuant to a provision in the divorce decree concerning separation of property. This provision was originally structured to account for spousal support but the language was "modified" by subsequent agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Rizzolo to read as "separation of property" instead of "spousal support." She states in the four years since this agreement was executed she has not received a single payment nor has she taken any action to attempt to enforce this divorce decree. See Ex. 3 at 143:23-147:24; 234:8-237:4.
- Ms. Rizzolo repeatedly visited Rick while he was incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los Angeles, California. See Ex. 3 at 119:12-21.
- Rick and Lisa Rizzolo continue to share signatory authority over a credit card held at Wells Fargo with a twenty-seven thousand dollar available line of credit (\$27,000.00). See Ex. 3 at 102:7-103:12. Only one monthly statement was produced showing account activity on this credit card.

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- Lisa accepted delivery of Rick's 1958 Chevrolet Corvette at the Canyon Gate marital home immediately upon his release from prison. See Ex. 3 at 128:1-129:10. She never disclosed this information in response to multiple discovery requests which would encompass this information.
- Rick remains on Lisa's guest list at the Canyon Gate home as a permanent guest who is free to come and go as he pleases. See Ex. 3 at 129:11-21.
- Rick was actually served with the summons and complaint at the couple's marital home, long after the divorce decree had been entered. See Ex. 3 at 207:17-208:2.
- Presently hanging in the stairwell of Lisa's Canyon Gate home is an original Leroy Neiman painting of the divorced couple. See Ex. 3 at 175:7-176:14.

C. The Documents Must Be Produced In An Expedient Manner

Pursuant to LR 26-7(a), Plaintiff will set forth, in full, Plaintiff Kirk Henry's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production and Defendant Lisa Rizzolo's Answers, Responses and Supplements thereto for purposes of this renewed motion to compel. This discovery was similarly requested from Rick Rizzolo on the same date. Plaintiffs' contemporaneous motion to compel Rick Rizzolo's compliance was ultimately granted without any reservations (#117). See Ex. 2. In both the original motions to compel Rick and Lisa Rizzolo, Plaintiffs cited extensive case law permitting the discovery of a Defendants' financial information in cases involving the UFTA. The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion by making the following finding:

Plaintiffs' claim is contingent but otherwise viable, and would potentially be frustrated by allegedly wrongful asset transfers. Plaintiffs therefore must be permitted to pursue the discovery at issue in support of their claims for conspiracy to defraud, common law fraud, and violation of the UFTA.

See Ex. 2 at p. 3 (emphasis added).

During her deposition, Ms. Rizzolo acknowledged the multitude of documents which had already been requested in discovery but had not been produced. Moreover, after she was advised of her duty to obtain the documents from sources over which she has "control" (i.e., mortgage

companies, insurance companies, banks, and the law firms she jointly hired with her husband). She agreed to obtain the requested documents. Despite that commitment, Ms. Rizzolo has failed to supplement even a single interrogatory or request for production since her deposition. Her counsel has likewise failed to respond to repeated requests by Plaintiffs' counsel seeking supplementation. She must now be compelled pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.

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o Bank Statements

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Interrogatory No. 8: List any and all financial institution accounts you currently maintain, whether business or personal, checking or savings, or jointly owned, or to which you hold in trust for anyone else.

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Answer: Objection. Interrogatory No. 8 is overbroad and burdensome and seeks information regarding assets which are subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information. Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: Wells Fargo, Sun West.

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> Interrogatory No. 9: List and give full details concerning any account not listed above, held in any name other than your own, or over which you have dominion, possession, or control.

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Answer: Objection. Interrogatory No. 9 is overbroad and burdensome and seeks information regarding assets which are subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial

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information.

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Request No. 23: Produce documents which record, reflect, refer or relate to defendant's domestic and/or foreign bank accounts, regardless of whether the same be held in sole or joint names since September 20, 2001, to the present date.

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Response: Objection. Request No. 23 is overbroad and burdensome, vague and ambiguous as it is phrased in a manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of Defendant. It further seeks information regarding assets subject to

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exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information.

<u>Supplemental Response:</u> (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: See attached LR00244, LR00263-LR00285.

All monthly statements for the relevant period (September 20, 2001 to the present) should be produced without any intermittent omissions such as an entire year of missing statements from her offshore account held at Capital Security Bank. This account, interestingly enough, is the account housing over \$6 million dollars as of June 30, 2008 and is the same account Rick has milked for hundreds of thousands of dollars over the last few years.

Responsive documents produced thus far are limited to one monthly statement from her main Wells Fargo checking account; one monthly statement from two small checking accounts at Wells Fargo; a monthly credit card statement from Wells Fargo on an account she holds with Rick; a certificate of deposit receipt from Sun West Bank; and a series of statements from her Capital Security Bank account held under her separate property trust.

o Trust Information

<u>Interrogatory No. 12:</u> List any property you hold or have held as trustee of a testamentary or inter vivos trust since September 20, 2001, and identify any trust you have created or contributed to for the benefit of others since September 20, 2001.

Answer: Objection. Interrogatory No. 12 seeks information that is irrelevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. It further seeks assets subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information. Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: To the best of Defendant's recollection, all real and personal property has

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been transferred to her separate property trust, including: 8632 Canyon View Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89117; 195 N. Harbor Drive, Unit 1301, Chicago, Illinois 76015; 1104 W. Ocean Front, Newport Beach, California 92661; 34 Sablewood, Ladera Ranch, California; 2008 Range Rover; her gun collection, household furniture and furnishings, and Oppenheimer Accounts #G85-1304084 & G85-1800002.

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<u>Request No. 13:</u> Produce all documents which reflect, refer, record or relate to any trust under which defendant is or was settlor or beneficiary, at any time from September 20, 2001, to the present date.

Response: Objection. Request No. 13 is overbroad and burdensome as it is phrased in a manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of Defendant. It further seeks information regarding assets subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information.

<u>Supplemental Response:</u> (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: See LR00007-LR00019. Further, the following documentation is available for disclosure following entry of a stipulated order for protection, LR00570-LR00801.

Inquiry of Ms. Rizzolo at her deposition revealed a vast number of important documents relating to the trusts which have not been produced. Ms. Rizzolo represented that most documents are in the possession of her attorneys at LS&C and includes copies of checks, records of payment, wire transfer records, promissory notes, loan agreements, billing invoices, and engagement letters – documents which were then subpoenaed by Plaintiffs from LS&C on May 13, 2009. See Ex. 4. LS&C objected to the subpoena duces tecum by asserting the attorney-client privilege but agreed to produce the documents provided written authorization from the client is given. See Ex. 7. Ms. Rizzolo expressed no qualms about placing a phone call and requesting these documents from her attorneys. See Ex. 3 at 251:14-252:9.

This Court has previously ordered production of these types of documents in its December 29, 2008 written order, which compelled the law firm PS&L to comply with the Rule 45 subpoena Plaintiff served on its custodian of records (#52). The opinion reads:

Checks, records of payment and attorney billing records generally do not fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. Checks are negotiated through a bank and, therefore, are not confidential communications. Nor are they likely to contain information protected by the work-product doctrine. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1969). In Clark v. Am. Commerce Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 130 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit stated that the identity of the client, the amount of the fee, the identification of payment by case file name and the general purpose of the work performed are usually not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Clark, 974 F.2d at 129 (citations omitted).

* * * :

Courts have also held that attorney engagement letters or retainer agreements are not protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. *United States v. Blackman*, 72 F.3d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1995); *In re Michaelson*, 882 F.2d 882, (9th Cir. 1975).

* * * *

Financial information contained in the records of Patti, Sgro & Lewis, such as checks or billing records, or transmittal sheets relating to financial transactions with or by the clients, may contain or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs are entitled to conduct reasonable discovery to determine if evidence exists that will support their causes of action.

See Ex. 5 at pp. 6-8.

The trust documents in and of themselves are simply not sufficient. There are foreign bank accounts tied to these trusts and legal bills evidencing the movement of funds to and from these offshore accounts.

Documents showing the creation of these trusts have been produced; the next step is to provide documentation reflecting the administration and accounting for these trusts. Defendant should be compelled to answer Interrogatory no. 12 and produce documentation responsive to Request nos. 13 and 18 which asks for more than just the trust agreements.

o Dispositions of Property

<u>Interrogatory No. 17:</u> Identify if you have, at any time since September 20, 2001, entered into any transaction with your former spouse or any other relative involving the transfer, conveyance, assignment or other disposition of any of your real or personal property and describe the terms thereof.

Answer: Objection. Interrogatory No. 17 is vague and ambiguous as drafted because the use of the words "conveyed or disposed," and "any property," requires this answering Defendant to ponder, guess and/or speculate in order to decide what is and what is not meant by use of the identified terms and consequently, Plaintiff has failed to phrase this request with reasonable particularity. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information. Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: Under the terms of the Divorce Decree, Defendant received certain community property assets as a division of the marital estate.

<u>Supplemental Answer:</u> (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: Under the terms of the Divorce Decree, Defendant received certain community property assets as a division of the marital estate. Defendant also gave her daughter, Leslie Rizzolo, the 2005 Range Rover which was awarded to her pursuant to the terms of the Divorce Decree.

<u>Request No. 14:</u> Produce all documents which reflect, refer, record or relate to any assignments or transfers of real or personal property made by defendant to any other person at any time from September 20, 2001, to the present date.

Response: Objection. Request No. 13 is overbroad and burdensome as it is phrased in a manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of Defendant. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information. Without waiving objections, Defendant responds as follows: With the exception of Defendant's trade in of her 2004 Range Rover and 2005 Range Rover to purchase her current vehicle, Defendant has not made any transfers of real or personal property to anyone from September 20, 2001 to the present. With respect to trade ins, Defendant has no documentation within her possession.

<u>Supplemental Response:</u> (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: Defendant traded in her 2004 Range Rover

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and 2002 Mercedes Benz to purchase her current vehicle and gave her 2005 Range Rover to her daughter but has not documentation regarding those transfers within her possession. See also LR00007-LR00019.

Focusing on intangible personal property, it is best to begin with a question – where is the disclosure and/or production of documents which reflect the seven hundred thousand dollars (\$700,000.00) in purported loans she has given Rick since the divorce? Ms. Rizzolo must be compelled to produce all documentation she has reflecting any gifts of money made to Rick Rizzolo, Bart Rizzolo, or any other person since September 20, 2001.

Divorce Decree Information

Request No. 26: Produce any and all documents which record, reflect, refer or relate to defendant's divorce decree with Defendant Rick Rizzolo since September 20, 2001.

Response: Objection. Request No. 25 is overbroad and burdensome, vague and ambiguous as it is phrased in a manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of Defendant. It further seeks information regarding assets subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information. Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: See attached.

Supplemental Response: (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: See LR00020-LR00046.

Plaintiffs have exhausted all methods for which to obtain responsive documents to this Request. Plaintiffs previously subpoenaed the law firm that jointly represented Rick and Lisa Rizzolo in this collusive divorce (Patti Sgro). According to the Rizzolos' attorneys, the documents were lost and/or destroyed in a "flood." The Request asked for any documents which "record, reflect, refer or relate" to the Defendant's divorce decree. She produced the pleadings...documents readily available as public records and already in possession Plaintiffs'

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possession. Accordingly, Ms. Rizzolo must be compelled to produce further documentation, including any documents which "record, reflect, refer or relate" to the divorce decree – engagement letters, billing invoices, statements of account, records of payment, and copies of checks.

o Loan Applications

<u>Request No. 15:</u> Produce all documents which constitute or embody all applications for loans, credit and/or financial assistance made or submitted by defendant, either alone or jointly with another person, at any time from September 20, 2001, to the present date whether personal or on behalf of any entity in which defendant held an interest of any kind or type.

Response: Objection. Request No. 15 is overbroad and burdensome as it is phrased in a manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of Defendant. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information. Without waiving objections, Defendant responds as follows: Defendant has no such documentation.

<u>Supplemental Response:</u> (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: See attached. Defendant has no such documentation within her possession; she has gone through her files and cannot locate the actual loan application for the property located at 34 Sablewood Circle, Ladera Ranch, California 92694. She did however, find her escrow documentation for the property which is attached as LR00328-LR00451.

Ms. Rizzolo's actual loan application has not been produced nor has she taken the necessary steps to obtain it. She did, however, agree at her deposition that she would produce these documents but has failed to do so since. *See* Ex. 3 at 248:10-250:15. She must be compelled to comply her discovery obligations and obtain this loan application.

o Insurance Policies

<u>Request No. 11:</u> Produce all insurance policies, including life, personal property, automobile, homeowners, or business liability insurance policies, owned by defendant or under which

defendant is or was named as a beneficiary, at any time from September 20, 2001, to the present date.

Response: Objection. Request No. 11 is overbroad and burdensome as it is phrased in a

manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of Defendant. It further seeks information regarding assets subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information.

<u>Supplemental Response:</u> (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: See LR00246-LR00262. Defendant also states that she may be a beneficiary under a policy owned by someone other than herself but does not currently have a copy of the policy in her possession and would disclose the same only following entry of a stipulated order of protection.

With the exception of the single automobile and two homeowner's policies referenced in her supplemental response, she failed to produce all other policies. She provides various forms of support for her children, grandchildren, and son-in-law including *health and automobile insurance policies*. See Ex. 3 at 26:10-12; 29:16-23; 33:15-34:9. She agreed to produce these documents but has failed to do so. See Ex. 3 at 34:15. She must be compelled.

o General Financial Information

<u>Request No. 16:</u> Produce all documents which reflect, record, refer or relate to, or contain information concerning the financial condition and/or net worth of defendant at any time during the period from September 20, 2001, to the present date.

Response: Objection. Request No. 16 is overbroad and burdensome as it is phrased in a manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of Defendant. It further seeks information regarding assets subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the

discovery of financial information. Without waiving objections, Defendant responds as follows: See Responses to Request No. 1.

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Supplemental Response: (same objection as above). Without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: See previously provided LR00001-LR00078 and attached LR00079-LR00569. Moreover, the documentation LR00570-LR00801 is available following entry of a stipulated order for protection.

Request No. 18: Produce all other books, records, receipts, contracts, agreements, invoices, documents of title, ownership, or indebtedness, or documents otherwise pertaining to the assets of the defendant.

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Response: Objection. Request No. 18 is overbroad and burdensome as it is phrased in a manner which could encompass any number of documents which would have no relevant or potential for admissibility in the present action and which are not in the custody or control of It further seeks information regarding assets subject to exemption under NRS § 21.090. Defendant further objects and relies on Austell v. Smith, 112 FRD 230 (WDNC 1986), E.E.O.C. v. Mahu Prabhu, Inc., 2008 WL 2795558 (WDNC 2008), Hughes v. Groves, 47 FRD 52 (W.D.Mo. 1969) in determining that only present financial status is relevant for punitive damages purposes as well as Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine, Ltd., 179 FRD 281 (C.D.Cal. 1998), which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a factual basis for a punitive damages claim prior to the discovery of financial information. Without waiving objections, Defendant responds as follows: Defendant has no such additional information within her possession.

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Supplemental Response: (same objection as above). Without waiving objections, Defendant responds as follows: LR00001-LR00006 and attached LR00288, LR00292-LR00294, LR00306-LR00309, LR00319-LR00327, LR00328-LR00377.

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The Henrys' right to obtain discovery relevant to the Rizzolos' financial condition will not be belabored here. It is financial information and it is clearly discoverable.

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D. Appropriate Sanctions Should Be Imposed On Lisa Rizzolo

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and serious sanctions imposed. See In re Heritage Bond Litigation, 223 F.R.D. 527, 531 fn. 1

Actions intended to "stonewall" a plaintiff in a fraudulent transfer case have been scorned

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(C.D.Cal. 2004). When a defendant fails to timely disclose clearly relevant documents and waits

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until discovery motions are filed, sanctions are proper and serve as a remedy to the wrong. Id.

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Lisa Rizzolo repeatedly engages in the identical dilatory discovery practices condemned in

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Heritage. She has "failed to timely disclose clearly relevant documents" and "wait[ed] until

discovery motions were filed" just like defendants in *Heritage*. *Id*. In *Heritage*, the court precluded the defendants from defending against a claim of fraudulent transfer of the marital residence and also awarded monetary sanctions in the amount of \$4,835.00. *Id*. at 533. Ms. Rizzolo should be sanctioned similarly as a deterrent to her ongoing discovery abuse.

A party may move to compel discovery if the opposing party fails to answer interrogatories or fails to respond to a request for the production of documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(iii)-(iv). Further, "an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). In the event the Court requires discovery be answered or produced after the filing of this motion, Plaintiff is entitled to "reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). "[T]he language of the Rule itself is mandatory, dictating that the Court must award expenses upon granting a motion to compel disclosure unless one of the specified bases for refusing to make such an award is found to exist." DL v. District of Columbia, 251 F.R.D. 38, 49 (D.D.C. 2008) quoting Cobell v. Norton, 226 F.R.D. 67, 90 (D.D.C. 2005). Sanctions pursuant to FRCP 37(a)(5)(A) serve a "compensatory purpose" to remedy the opponent's wrong. See GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 193 (E.D.Pa. 2008) citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565 (1978) ("The award...makes the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy.").

The factors to be considered for imposing sanctions under Rule 37 include: "(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to [the party seeking sanctions]; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions." *Rio Props.*,

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Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002) (sanctions imposed and costs and attorney's fees awarded for violation of discovery orders).

Ms. Rizzolo and her counsel have continuously sought to prolong this litigation by obstructing Plaintiffs' access to discovery and failing to take reasonable steps necessary in order to obtain responsive documents. Therefore, the Court's tandem interest in expeditiously resolving the case and reinforcing adherence to the discovery plan would best be served by the imposition of sanctions, including but not limited to, attorney's fees in bringing the instant motion.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that Plaintiff Kirk Henry's Renewed Motion to Compel Defendant Lisa Rizzolo and for Appropriate Sanctions be granted.

DATED this 34 day of June, 2009.

CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS

XMPBELI

OK F. DEGREE, ESQ. (11102)

700 South Seventh Street

Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff Kirk Henry

Cas	2:08-cv-00635-PMP-GWF	Document 127	Filed 06/05/2009	Page 30 of 30					
1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE								
2		CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE							
3	Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Campbell & Williams and								
4	on the 5th day of June, 2009, service of a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs'								
5	Renewed Motion to Compel Defendant Lisa Rizzolo and for Appropriate Sanctions was made via								
6	CM/ECF and U.S. Mail to the following:								
7									
8	Mark B. Bailus, Esq. Bailus, Cook & Kelesis, Ltd.								
9	400 South Fourth Street, #300								
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101								
11	Attorneys for Defendant/Cross Claimant Lisa Rizzolo								
12	C. Stanley Hunterton, Esq. Hunterton & Associates								
13									
14	333 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101								
15	Attorneys for Plaintiff Amy Henry								
16	Rick Rizzolo								
17	7 1760 Amarone Way								
18	Henderson, NV 89012								
19			Ø . ,	7-0					
20	Employee of Campbell and Williams								
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